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In their discussion about emptiness, Manjushri and Vimalakirti exemplify the debate over emptiness that was going on within Mahayana Buddhist literature about Hinayana Buddhists. Vimalakirti, representing Mahayana perspectives, repeatedly breaks down Manjushri's questions and shows them to be in contradiction to the very concept of emptiness.
After discussing the sickness of a bodhisattva, Manjushri asks, "Householder, why is your house empty? Why have you no servants?" His question is founded upon worldly concerns-ordinarily a sick person would want, if not require, someone to care for him until he is well. As Vimalakirti is not focused on the world, however, he replies, "Manjushri, all Buddha-fields are also empty." Vimalakirti is attempting to do a couple of things. First, he is telling Manjushri that his awareness must be expanded to include all of existence. Since Mahayanists believe that Nirvana and Samsara are merely different perceptions of the same thing, their aim must be to attain true perception-to encompass everything within their thoughts. Such perception is beyond Manjushri's immediate and limited concerns. Further, Vimalakirti diverts the entire conversation from worldliness (his sickness, servants, etc.) to a metaphysical one about the nature of Buddha-files and their inherent emptiness. Vimalakirti dismisses the question of servants because it is inconsequential. The only relevant issue in the question is the implied emptiness. Manjushri brings up the emptiness of Vimalakirti's household, but he doesn't quite realize how Vimalakirti is going to interpret his question.
Vimalakirti's answer is a pointed statement about the equivalent nature of all places. That all Buddha-fields are empty explains the emptiness of his own home, the irrelevancy of that emptiness and it equalizes the Buddha Shakyamuni's field with all other Buddha-fields. If all Buddha-fields are empty, then no Buddha-field may be considered better or more meaningful than Shakyamuni's. Though this commentary is only a side issue (and plays no further role in this discussion, which centers around the nature emptiness itself), it was of significant concern to ancient Buddhists to establish that their own historical Buddha was equally enlightened as the mythological/cosmological Buddhas of story.
Manjushri then asks Vimalakirti, "What makes them empty?" With this question, the conversation turns completely to the metaphysical, but Vimalakirti once again questions the assumptions behind Manjushri's question by answering, "They are empty because of emptiness." Vimalakirti says that the very nature of emptiness, that everything is empty, makes it necessary that Buddha-fields be empty. For Manjushri to ask why Buddha-fields are empty implies that, not only must there be a reason for it, but that there are things, which are not empty. Since these are not so, Vimalakirti's answer states that the existence of emptiness itself dictates that the fields must be empty. To as why is to be asking a futile and unimportant question.
Either Manjushhri doesn't really understand the answer or he is trying to make Vimalakirti give a more complete answer for others. As such, he asks, "What is 'empty' about emptiness?" In response, Vimalakirti says, "Constructions are empty, because of emptiness." Vimalakirti describes both Manjushri's question and the nature of any positable answer with the term 'construction.' As the nature of emptiness necessitates the emptiness of Buddha-fields, it also necessitates the emptiness of all constructions. The verbal use of emptiness is a construct. All language is a construct; therefore, emptiness must be a construct. Since emptiness is a construct, it must be empty. Even beyond language, thoughts are constructs and they are, therefore, empty. Vimalakirti is largely implying that an answer to Manjushri's question cannot be given in the same terms as the question, itself.
Its emptiness is beyond the mere description of 'empty,' however. That is why Manjushri then asks, "Can emptiness be conceptually constructed?" Since the term emptiness is, itself, a construct, Manjushri looks for another way to develop the concept. But Vimalakirti tells him that his way of thinking continues to be skewed. Vimalakirti responds to Manjushri by saying, "Even that concept is itself empty, and emptiness cannot construct emptiness." Emptiness is emptiness and its nature is such that all things must be empty. The concept of emptiness being constructed is empty-it has no realty. Vimalakirti is saying that one cannot take an illusion and from it build reality.
In everything that he says to Manjushri, Vimalakirti describes the emptiness of the world. For every question Manjushri asks, Vimalakirti replies by discrediting the question and the answer. Manjusrhi's questions resemble those of the Hinayana Buddhists-the are largely an attempt to reduce their own beliefs, which are largely irrational, to rational understandable constructs. Vimalakirti, however, repeatedly shows that the questions themselves make no sense within the context of emptiness. Once one accepts the concept of emptiness, one must then proceed to accept that the world around is illusion. Vimalakirti first shows that the immediate worldly concerns of Manjushri are empty and then he transfers that same emptiness to the religious doctrines of Buddhism.
To Vimalakirti and the Mahayanists, emptiness is absolute. Even though it cannot be discussed absolutely, it exists as such. Vimalakirti uses enigmatic phrases to show, not only that the words of Manjushri are empty, but that his own are, as well. Everything Vimalakirti says is empty and he knows this to be true; therefore, he avoids saying things, which might be misconstrued as being absolute. In what he describes, the only absolute is the emptiness, which cannot be described. The descriptions, themselves, are empty and thus emptiness is indescribable.
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