An in depth look at the pivotal War of the North Atlantic and the forces that shaped Nai defeat.
In April of 1940 the Allies seemed to have control of the war at sea. In the first three months of that year the handful of German U-boats under the control of Admiral Donitz had managed to sink just three Allied ships. The French and British Navies had, during that same period, sunk eight U-Boats. These figures stood in sharp contrast to those of the closing months of the previous year. In November 1939, the Germans had put to lethal use their infamous magnetic mine. This new technology was able to outsmart traditional mine-sweeping techniques. In November alone, 27 Allied ships were destroyed by such mines. The British had soon figured out a counter to the mine technology, however, and by the beginning of the new year, had countered it's strength.
In early March 1940 Admiral Donitz was preparing for a stepped up campaign in the North Atlantic. His Fuhrer was not pleased with the lack of recent results and , he had decided, it was time for a Blitzkrieg by sea. Just as he was about to send 14 U-Boats into the North Atlantic and North Sea areas, however, he was suddenly ordered to halt all operations in the North Atlantic. The Invasion of Scandinavia was under way and the U-Boats were required there to attack allied warships that tried to attack the German convoys heading for Norway. 31 U-Boats were diverted towards this mission.
The result of this was that German operations on the North Atlantic waters were virtually non-existent during the period of April-May, 1940. In addition, the U-Boats in the Norwegian campaign failed to have much impact. This was due to the fact that the torpedoes being used by the Germans were chronically unreliable. The following excerpts from U-Boat logs presented to Admiral Donitz in mid 1940 undrescore this fact:
"April 11:
Launched torpedoes at two destroyers at 10 in the evening. Result not observed.
At 1230 hours, launched three torpedoes at the Cumberland. Miss: explosion at the end of the run. At 2115 hours, launched three torpedoes at a York class cruiser. Premature explosions. Depth 23 feet.
April 18
Two premature explosions between Iceland and the Shetlands."
On April 16th, U-47 under the control of Commander Gunther Prien surprised a British convoy at anchor in the Byddenfjord region. He fired eight torpedoes, all of which failed. Prien returned to tell his superiors in disgust that it was "useless to send him to fight with a dummy rifle." The main problems with the torpedoes were that their percussion detonators ran about 10 feet below the depth for which they had been designed, with the result that they often passed harmlessly beneath the keel of the target. There were also problems with the magnetic detonator devices used in the torpedoes. The bombs often exploded prematurely. This was disastrous for the Germans for it would give away the presence of the U-Boats and result in violent counter attacks.
By June of 1940, the Germans had achieved victory in Norway and admiral Donitz's fleet was able to resume activities in the North Atlantic. An intensive campaign during June was supported by Luftwaffe strikes on British shipping and brought satisfying results.By the end of June 140 Allied merchant ships had been sunk. Then with the surrender of France and the Axis support of Italy, the situation swung firmly in favor of Germany. Increasing victories on land had also given the Nazis control of many new Atlantic ports, including those of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. The British were now well and truly on the back foot.
The Germans now had a great strategic advantage over the British. They did not, however, have a fleet strong enough to take full advantage of their position. Admiral Donitz, however, was keen to seize the advantage. He decided to base his U-Boats in the newly acquired French Atlantic ports and began an inspection of the ports before the Armistice with France had even come into effect. From early August teams of German workers arrived to overhaul the port installations and make all the necessary alterations which would be needed by U-Boats returning from the high seas. At the same time huge pens were being designed, which would house the boats in dock under 23 feet of concrete to protect them from allied bombing.
Donitz assembled a large team of specialists equipped with sophisticated electronic equipment designed to further enhance his interception technology. They also equipped the U-Boats with high quality radio communication equipment. This allowed the U-Boats to operate not as individual units, but as powerful "˜wolf packs', hunting down the enemy together. This group attack was, in fact, was a great contribution in submarine tactics. The U-Boats also began to attack mainly at night and on the surface. And to top it all of, an improved percussion detonator meant that German torpedoes now functioned better than before.
The British were taken by surprise at these sudden improvements in German Naval capability. Their reaction was sluggish. In the second half of 1940 they suffered terribly at the hands of the U-Boats with 285 ships sunk between July and December of 1940. All of this was achieved with a total of just 57 U-Boats. With seasoned commanders at their helm, these forces were able to achieve an enviable level proficiency. British response was to concentrate on surface or air borne searches for the U-Boats and bomb them from the air. But this proved to be like searching for a needle in a haystack. In desperation, Winston Churchill turned to President Roosevelt asking for the cession of 40 or 50 American Destroyers which had been built at the end of World War One. Roosevelt replied to Churchill's demands with a counter proposal - in exchange for 50 old Destroyers Great Britain would allow the United States to set up and occupy bases in Guiana, the Antilles, Bermuda, the Bahamas and Newfoundland for a period of 99 years. By agreeing Britain placed the defense of these scattered British possessions in American hands.
Even before these Destroyers could be pressed into service the situation began to turn in favor of the British. Cessation of German concentration at invasion ports enabled a number of Destroyers which had been earmarked for operations against a German invasion fleet in the Narrow Seas to be moved to the Western approaches to the North Atlantic. On the other hand, German intensity on the water began to diminish as more U-Boats were sunk by the British. Hermann Goering was head of armaments production and raw materials. He was also chief of the Luftwaffe. In reality Navy production was forced to proceed with the crumbs falling from the table of the Luftwaffe. And when plans for Operations "˜Sea Lion' and "˜Barbarossa' were rolled out, interest in navy operations was even further set back.
As a result of the lack of Conviction at German High Command, the production of replacement U-Boats began to drop off from the end of 1940. And the slowness with which the Germans expanded their U-Boat construction was to have very fortunate consequences for Britain. Their was no communication between the Navy and the Luftwaffe when a close tie in between the two could have had lethal consequences for the British, with the aircraft directing the U-Boats o their targets. Admiral Dontiz was painfully aware of this and towards the end of 1940 he tried to explain this to Hitler with the following statement:
"The historians will describe World War Two in different ways, according to their nationality. On one point, however, they will be unanimous. In the 20th Century - that of the aeroplane - the German Navy fought without it's own air force as if the aeroplane did not exist. And they will be unable to explain it."
Such pleas, however, were to no avail. The final failure of the German Navy, despite it's obvious strategic advantages, could be put down to the attitudes of those who were pulling the strings, most notably the Fuhrer himself. Hitler's attitude can be gauged from the following statement:
" I have a National Socialist Air Force, a reactionary Army and a Christian Navy!"
Given this frame of mind, and with the extra American Destroyers, British victory on the water was inevitable.
